CO129-496 - Public Offices - 1926 — Page 82

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

CHINA.

81

[March 16, 1926.]

SECTION 7.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[F 1093/184/10]

(No 47.) Sir,

No. 1.

Sir R. Macleay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 16.)

Peking, January 19, 1926. IN reply to your despatch No. 831, Confidential, of the 23rd September, I have the honour to submit the following observations on the questions of policy in connection with the arms embargo raised in the papers enclosed therein:—

2. The situation in China has of course undergone a change since the date of Mr. Ashton-Gwatkin's memorandum of the 7th September last, and we can for the moment no longer say that "in every part of China two parties are facing each other, which may be characterised as (1) a pro-Soviet party bitterly opposed to us, and (2) an anti-Soviet party which is disposed to be friendly"; nor that we are fighting for our lives in China, and it seems unfair that we should hand our enemy a deadly weapon while we ourselves remain deliberately unarmed." Since the above words were written some of the armies and military groups have dissolved into new formations, thus furthering a general disintegration; while the military faction representing in the north the party No. (1) above referred to, having secured the momentary discomfiture of party No. (2), is professing to hold out the hand of friendship to us, and to be anxious to let bygones be bygones. It remains to be seen what these professions of friendship may be worth. But, in the meantime, such considerations as existed last summer in favour of our departure from our policy of strict neutrality have lost their force. This policy seems, indeed, to have been more than ever justified by the events of the past two months, and to be more than ever applicable to the present situation with its obscure outlook for the future. Moreover, the best Chinese public opinion is becoming increasingly strong against the importation of arms (see, for instance, the views on the subject expressed by General Huang Fu, as reported in my despatch No. 16 of the 5th January); while, as long as we adhere to our present arms embargo policy, we can at any rate refute absolutely and entirely, as far as we ourselves are concerned, the charge so often levied nowadays by the students and intellectuals against the foreigner, that he promotes the evil of militarism by importing arms into China. For the above reasons I do not consider, on broad grounds of general policy, that any departure from our present attitude towards the arms embargo is for the moment desirable; and I would go as far as to say that the effect at the present juncture of anything like a public withdrawal by His Majesty's Government from the embargo would be deplorable.

3. The situation has also been to some extent altered by the action of the Chinese Government in announcing, in the mandate of the 2nd September last, their intention to issue no more permits for the importation of arms. It is possible that this declaration of policy may well prove to be meaningless except ou paper, and that there may be political objectives behind the move in the sense of affording certain favoured militarists the opportunity of evading the prohibition. But, taking it at its face value, it seems to provide an opportunity for continuing the arms embargo with the nominal approval and co-operation of the Chinese Government, a factor which would provide a solid logical basis for the embargo policy which has hitherto been lacking. It is true that, arms and ammunition being in any case under treaty prohibited imports except to the order of the Central Government, the declared intention of the latter to discontinue importation would on the face of it renier any embargo arrangements, including our own legislation on the subject, superfluous. But the necessity of such arrangements would, of course, in actual fact remain owing to the lack of effective control by the Chinese Central Government over distant provincial centres and their semi-independent military authorities, who, as, for instance, in the case of those in Manchuria and Kwangtung, are able to compel the local Customs to respect their provincial huchaos, and who can thus, in spite of any well-meant professions on the part of the Central Government, only be prevented from obtaining arms from abroad by a self-denying arrangement on the part of the Powers. It is admitted that the Chinese Government may at any moment revoke the mandate of the 2nd September. But "face" counts, as we know, for much in this country, and it is possible that the Chinese may in time find themselves so bound by

[1226 q-7)

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